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Abstract
Firms adjust their employment to changes in output. But they tend to adjust it only
partially. Typically, labor is hoarded in downturns and subsequently firms have to hire
less in upturns. Investment in labor hoarding may therefore be influenced by factors
that impede investments, such as financial constraints. Using firm-level data, we
show that financial constraints increase the sensitivity of employment to fluctuations
in output considerably. When output changes, financially constrained firms resize
their labor force substantially more than firms that have abundant funding. Limited
internal funding opportunities turn out to be just as important as the reduced access
to external finance. The strongest impact, however, is observed when internal and
external constraints occur jointly. In that case, firms lay off two-and-a-half times more
employees than unconstrained firms. The amplifying effect of financial constraints is
similar in upturns and downturns, implying that financially constrained firms not only
reduce their workforce more when demand decreases, but they also hire more labor
when demand increases.
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1 Introduction
Employment typically rises in booms and decreases in recessions. But often firms adjust
their employment only partially. That is, they ‘hoard labor’ in downturns and subsequently
hire less in upturns. Labor hoarding can be the optimal response of firms facing labor
market frictions, because of the costs associated with hiring and firing staff. Employers
confronted with a temporary drop in output retain more employees than they actually
require because they expect to need those workers again in the future.
While there is ample evidence for the existence of labor hoarding, less is known about
the reasons why some firms hoard more labor than others. In this paper, we look at
the differences in financial constraints across firms and assess how they influence firms’
hoarding behaviour. Focussing on the effect of financial constraints on the cyclically of
employment, we examine the hypothesis that in a downturn, financially constrained firms
are not able to hoard labor to the same extent as unconstrained firms and consequently
have to hire more labor in a subsequent upturn.
To estimate the impact of financial constraints on employment adjustment, we use a large
panel of firm-level balance-sheet data broadly drawn from the population of Swiss firms.
The panel does not select in favor of publicly listed firms, unlike many data sets using
firm-level balance-sheet information. Moreover, the data cover not only manufacturing but
also most goods and services-producing industries, which represent approximately 70% of
Swiss GDP and 80% of full-time employment. The dataset also allows us to analyze which
source of financial constraints is important for labor hoarding – we distinguish between
constraints to internal funding, such as low liquidity and low profits, and constraints to
external funding, such as low collateral or a small balance sheet.
Our results show that financial constraints considerably increase the sensitivity of employment
to fluctuations in output. When output changes, financially constrained firms resize their
labor force substantially more than firms that have abundant funding availability. In
particular, firms with low liquidity and low profits, as well as firms with a small balance
sheet, have to lay off substantially more workers during downturns. Low collateral also
has an impact, but the effect is weaker. The strongest impact is observed when internal
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and external constraints occur jointly. The amplifying effects of financial constraints are
quite similar in upturns and downturns. Financially constrained firms not only reduce
their workforce more when demand decreases, but they also hire more labor when demand
increases. Our results are therefore consistent with the view that financial constraints
hamper the labor hoarding ability of firms. Taken to the macro level, we show that up to
25% of the variance in aggregate employment can be explained by financial constraints.
We find further that the effect of financial constraints on labor hoarding is more pronounced
for firms paying high wages. High-wage firms hoard more labor, suggesting that high-wage
employees are associated with higher hiring and firing costs. Moreover, we conduct a set
of tests that support the causal interpretation and confirm the robustness of our results.
In analyzing labor hoarding in combination with financial constraints, our paper links
two strands of the literature. The large and long-standing macro-labor literature, on the
one hand, sees adjustment costs as important in explaining employment dynamics (see
overview in Biddle, 2014). The concept of labor hoarding became an integral part of the
labor market literature with the seminal contribution of Solow (1964). He argued that
important costs are associated with adjustments in employment. These costs include not
only direct costs, such as redundancy costs and the costs for searching, hiring and training
new staff, but also indirect costs, such as the reduced motivation of the remaining staff or
the risk of losing market share if demand were to pick up suddenly, leaving a firm without
enough staff to meet the higher demand.
The macro-finance literature, on the other hand, analyzes the influence of financial constraints
on investment in capital. Indeed, labor hoarding has an investment-like feature: the costs
of hoarding labor in the short term are higher than the average unit costs. In other words
they lower labor productivity. These costs have to be carried in the present. By contrast,
the gains of labor hoarding materialize in the future, when demand picks up, in the form of
lower labor adjustment costs, such as lower recruiting and training costs. Like investment
decisions, labor hoarding does not immediately generate returns. No contemporaneous
pay-off can be used to pay the wages. This timing mismatch between the costs of and the
gains from labor hoarding has to be financed and, presumably, the financial health of a
firm will impact on its ability to hoard labor, as it does on investment in physical capital.
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When financial constraints become binding, firms will not be able to hoard as much labor
as otherwise desired.
The effect of reduced (or more expensive) funding availability on the joint dynamics of
investment and output has been extensively analyzed (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen, 1988, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996). In contrast, there is less
evidence about the influence of financial constraints on the adjustment of employment to
variations in output. A comprehensive analysis is still under way.
Recently, the large layoffs during the Great Recession have triggered interest in the
relationship between firms financing conditions and employment. The reduced capability
of banks to lend is shown to have been an important determinant of firms’ employment
adjustment decisions during large recessions (Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011) and
Benmelech, Frydman, and Papanikolaou (2017)).1
Cantor (1990) and Sharpe (1994), in contrast, examine in their seminal research the impact
of a reduced ability of firms to borrow. Funke, Maurer, and Strulik (1999), Ogawa (2003)
and Drakos and Kallandranis (2006) pursue in their work the analysis of the effect of
firm-side financial constraints on employment. They find that a firm’s leverage-ratio is
an important determinant of employment. In the following, Falato and Liang (2016)
demonstrate that the tightness of loan covenants has a substantial impact on employment
cuts. Also Borisov, Ellul, and Sevilir (2015) find that firms that are able to increase their
funding availability by going public increase their employment more than similar firms
that remain private. Cunat, Metzger, and Caggese (2017) examine the impact of financial
constraints on firing decisions of firms. They show that financially constrained firms tend
to fire more workers with shorter tenure and less of those with longer tenure, even though
the ones with shorter tenure tend to have higher productivity potential. This leads to
a misallocation of labor (similar to capital in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)).
These findings all show that financing constraints have a direct effect on employment.
Furthermore, Giroud and Mueller (2017) show that demand shocks during the Great
Recession had large effects on employment at firms with high leverage. Caggese and Cuat
1Further analyses focusing on the supply of credit as a source of financial constraints have been carried
out by Chodorow-Reich (2014), Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga (2015) and Basci, Baskaya,
and Kilinc (2011).
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(2008) show that fixed term workers are hired more by financially constrained firms. This
effect is asymmetric: it is stronger in periods when employment goes up than when it
goes down. Furthermore, they find that financing constraints increase the volatility of
employment, in particular the volatility of fixed-term employment. The findings in these
papers suggest that firm’s employment declines more in recessions if firms are financially
constrained, which is in line with the findings reported in this paper.2
This paper adds to the literature by examining the interdependency of financial constraints
and labor hoarding, that is, the increased sensitivity of employment to changes in output
due to the lack of funding abilities. For this, we analyse the differences in the labor
hoarding behaviour of firms depending if they are financially constrained or not. We
conduct the analysis for upturns and downturns separately in order to capture the sensitivity
of employment over the business cycle. Our finding, that constrained firms decrease their
employment more in a downturn and raise their employment more during an upturn, gives
evidence that financial constraints amplify the employment cycle.
Furthermore, we use a new data set, which includes balance-sheet and income statement
information for a large number of firms. The data is collected by the Swiss Statistical
Office and is underlying the official figures for industry-level and aggregate value-added.
The advantage is that this includes a broad set of firms, publicly listed and not-listed
firms. Publicly listed firms are arguably often larger firms that have better access to
external finance, thus financial constraints may matter even more for non-listed firms,
which are also included. Furthermore, using Swiss data has a specific advantage: In
many countries, firms’ employment adjustment behavior is affected by strict labor market
legislation. Employment protection rules hamper the flexibility of changes in employment.
Thus, a sluggish reaction of firms’ labor demand to shocks in those countries may not
reflect optimal behavior against the backdrop of high labor adjustment costs with legal
restrictions. The Swiss labor market, by contrast, is in international comparison ranked
as one of the most flexible, with relatively few regulations regarding the hiring and laying
2A study from Balleer, Gehrke, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2016) shows that the availability of short-time
working subsidies dampens the decline in aggregate employment in a recession. Such subsidy schemes can
be seen as an additional source of financing that relaxes financial constraints, increasing the ability to
hoard labor in a recession.
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off of staff.3 Working with Swiss data, we can therefore largely assume that our results
reflect firms’ hoarding behavior related to search and training costs and not to a country’s
labor legislation.
In addition, the data allows us to distinguish between constraints to internal funding
and constraints to external funding. Our data shows that the distinction between these
two types of constraints is relevant as the impact of both constraints has an independent
impact and because the share of firms being internally as well as externally constrained
is not negligible. Finally, the data includes proxies for the average wage paid in a firm
and therefore we can analyse if firms that tend to employ high-skilled workers also tend to
hoard more labor, which would be expected from recent evidence that shows that hiring
costs for skilled workers are larger than for unskilled workers (Blatter, Muehlemann, and
Schenker, 2012).
The next section discusses our empirical model. Section 3 describes the firm-level data used
in our analysis. The estimation results are discussed in Section 4 and the macroeconomic
implications in Section 5. Robustness checks are shown in section 6.
2 An empirical model of labor demand
To motivate our empirical estimation equation, we rely on the adjustment cost model
originally proposed by Nickell (1987), which is the basis of many empirical labor demand
studies.4
The underlying assumption is that adjustment of labor is costly due to both firing and
hiring costs. When demand changes, current and discounted future adjustment costs are
taken into account to maximize the present value of the firm’s earnings. In Nickell (1987)’s
3See Tella and MacCulloch (2005), for example.
4There are theoretical models implying that financial constraints induce hoarding behaviour, see e.g
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) or, more recently, Blanco and Navarro (2017). Based on these
approaches, our empirical labor demand equation may be motivated with micro-foundations. On this
backdrop, the model below should be considered as providing some motivation for the empirical equation
rather than as giving the empirical equation a strong structural interpretation. An alternative approach
to motivate the empirical equation would be to allow the flow of vacancies in Davis, Faberman, and
Haltiwanger (2013) to vary with financial constraints at the firm level.
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formulation, the optimal log-labor demand ei,t of firm i in period t is
ei,t = µei,t−1 + (1− µ)(1− αµ)Et
∞∑
j=0
(αµ)se∗i,t+j (1)
with e∗i,t being short-term equilibrium employment, defined as optimal employment in
the absence of adjustment costs.5 The coefficient µ is primarily a function of productivity
parameters and adjustment costs. The higher the adjustment cost, the slower the adjustment
to the short-term equilibrium will be. The coefficient α is inversely related to the real
interest rate. The lower the real interest rate, the more weight is given to future equilibrium
employment.
Following a negative demand shock leading to a decrease in e∗i,t, labor demand remains
above e∗i,t in the period in which the shock occurs. There are two reasons for this. First,
adjustment costs are assumed to be convex, such that a one-time adjustment of the labor
force generates higher costs than a series of small adjustments cumulating to an reduction
of the same magnitude.6 Second, if a demand shock is temporary, a complete downward
adjustment in labor would have to be fully reversed when the demand shock fades. Because
labor adjustment is costly, it is optimal for firms to adjust their labor only partially when
a demand shock is expected to be temporary. In this case, firms hoard labor.
To derive an observable model from the above equation, some assumptions on the determinants
of e∗i,t have to be imposed. A typical empirical specification (see, e.g., Ottawa 2004) makes
e∗i,t a function of log-demand yi,t and log-wages wi,t. Assuming stochastic processes for
these variables and adding other exogenous factorsXi,t, the following empirical specification
for the change of employment demand is obtained:
∆eti = γ˜n∆ei,t−1 + γ˜y∆yi,t + γ˜w∆wi,t + β˜Xi,t + i,t (2)
The coefficients in this equation are related to α, µ, and the properties of the stochastic
process for the exogenous variables.
5This formulation is obtained based on quadratic adjustment cost using a log-linear approximation.
6Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012) document that hiring costs are convex in Switzerland.
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Now consider the case in which financial frictions imply higher cost of financing. The
interest rate in the labor demand equation (1) is then larger. As a result, future misalignment
with equilibrium employment and, therefore, future adjustment costs are discounted with
a larger factor, and the concurrent adjustment is more complete. Generally speaking, the
higher the costs of financing, the less firms value future adjustment costs versus today’s
labor costs and the less a firm will hoard labor. Labor market frictions and financial
frictions thus work in opposite directions. While higher labor adjustment costs lead to
a reduction in cyclical employment fluctuation, financial constraints reinforce them. In
the following section, we provide firm-level measures of such constraints and subsequently
describe how these measures are incorporated into equation 2.
3 Data Description
We use a large panel of firm-level balance-sheet and income-statement data stretching from
1998 to 2013, placed at our disposal by the SFSO (Swiss Federal Statistical Office). Our
data set comprises 74, 065 observations at an annual frequency, including 16, 338 firms.
The data are collected at the firm level and not, as is often the case, at the plant level. It
is an unbalanced panel, that is, we do not observe every firm for all 16 years. However,
the sample is a comprehensive draw from the population of Swiss firms, including all
industries of the economy, except the financial and public sectors. The SFSO collects
data for all large firms on an annual basis. Smaller firms might be replaced in the sample
from time to time, with firms from the same industry and similar characteristics. The
data set has an advantage over more-frequently used data, such as Compustat, in that it
contains both privately-held and publicly listed firms as well as both large and very small
firms. The latter do not have to publish their balance sheets or income statements. This
is important, as the latter are likely to be particularly prone to limitations in external
sources of financing.
Employment is defined in full-time equivalent (FTE) units in logs denoted by ei,t. This
information is supplied by the firms in the sample when sending their balance sheets and
income statements to the SFSO. The log of value output, yi,t, is measured by subtracting
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Table 1: Sample statistics
Observations Employment V alue added
Total Firms average per firm average per firm
Whole sample 74065 16338 181 33080
Industries
Business Serv. 1 5066 1397 126 34113
Business Serv. 2 1991 612 218 20124
Construction 6644 1570 140 14546
Education 1299 350 106 10964
Energy 3113 547 97 39184
Entertainment 1942 519 80 12381
Health 3390 899 101 8287
IT 3043 768 212 56274
Manuf. Pharma 618 112 635 500871
Manuf. Invest. 13766 2488 176 26447
Manuf. Watches 3428 644 254 20238
Manuf. Other 8690 1579 139 49131
Mining 612 115 46 8852
Rest. Hotels 3580 785 116 9008
Trade 13038 3176 232 40820
Transport 3845 777 378 51981
Notes: Employment is the number of full-time equivalents (FTE). Business Services 1
(Real estate activities, legal, accounting, management, architecture, engineering activities,
scientific research and development, other professional, scientific and technical activities),
Business Services 2 (Administrative and support service activities), Construction, Education
(not including public schools), Energy (Energy supply, water supply, waste management),
Entertainment (Arts, entertainment, recreation and other services), Health (Human health and
social work activities), IT (Information and communication), Manufacturing of pharmaceutical
goods, Manufacturing of investment and intermediate goods, Manufacturing of watches
(Watches, computer, electronic and optical products), Manufacturing of other goods, Mining
(Mining and quarrying), Restaurants and Hotels (Accommodation and food service activities),
Trade (Retail and wholesale trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles), Transport
(Transportation and storage).
intermediate goods expenditure from total sales, which is the official calculation of the
SFSO for value added.7 Our dataset also includes a measure of average wages, wi,t, which
are measured as total wage expenditures divided by employment. It also includes physical
capital, which we measure by its book value in the balance sheet. Table 1 lists the number
of observations, the number of firms, the average full-time employment and the average
output per firm for each industry, which are the key variables in our empirical section.
Furthermore, the dataset contains information that can be used to construct firm-specific
measures of external and internal financial constraints. External financial constraints are
7Note that even if a firm operates across borders, the data excludes all foreign activities. Thus, output,
labor costs, numbers of employees, costs for intermediate goods etc. all relate to Swiss activities.
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factors that hinder firms from obtaining funds from outside investors and lenders. A firm
faces internal financial constrains if it is unable to bridge a drop in demand by using
internal funds.
In the spirit of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we classify firm-year observations as financially
constrained or unconstrained, depending on their values of indicators constructed from
their balance sheets. For our baseline equations, we define an indicator for a financially
unconstrained firm-year observation and a financially constrained observation. We use
several measures of financial health of a firm and define a constrained (unconstrained)
firm as a firm with value above (below) the median value of the constraint indicator. In
the empirical section, we first analyze the effect of each constraint separately and then
also for combinations of several constraints per firm.
We define two measures of external constraints. For our first measure, we use the size of a
firm’s balance sheet (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994,
Caggese and Cuat, 2008). The idea behind using size as a financial constraint is related
to the costs of asymmetric information. Firms with a small balance sheet tend to have
had little experience in the credit market, and there is limited available information on
their creditworthiness. In contrast, information on firms with large balance sheets is much
more available. Our second measure is the amount of collateral a firm owns. We define
collateral as the sum of a firm’s structures (buildings and land) and machines per unit
of outstanding debt. Because it is riskier to lend to firms with low collateral, these firms
have limited or more-costly access to external finance.
Second, we derive two different indicators for internal constraints. The data come from
firms’ income statements. Our first measure is liquidity defined as the ratio of sales to
labor costs, following Aghion, Farhi, and Kharroubi (2015). Because profits are usually
regarded as the main source of internal funding for investment, including investment in
labor hoarding, our second measure is the level of profits, defined as EBIT (earnings before
interest rates and taxes) per unit of output, which is a measure of a firm’s profitability.
The medians and the standard deviations of our constraint indicators are listed in Table 2.
The first row shows statistics for all observations and the rows below by the 16 industries.
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Table 2: Constraint variables
Liquidity Profitability Collateral Bal.Sheet
Md Sd Md Sd Md Sd Md Sd
Whole sample 2.75 24.18 0.30 0.11 0.49 4.42 14310 1482181
Within industries
Business Serv. 1 1.72 6.70 0.10 0.28 0.18 3.86 12177 662295
Business Serv. 2 1.86 3.38 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.67 6385 118884
Construction 2.25 1.64 0.07 0.10 0.36 0.58 11168 63570
Education 1.30 0.97 0.04 1.13 0.38 1.48 8075 29358
Energy 5.97 51.57 0.26 0.24 1.32 19.76 31065 722144
Entertainment 1.90 2.06 0.07 0.18 0.56 1.13 6225 136773
Health 1.27 0.44 0.04 0.18 0.84 3.65 5948 27814
IT 2.23 4.49 0.09 0.37 0.16 0.78 12147 978099
Manuf. Pharma 3.65 15.57 0.25 1.10 0.66 1.16 66739 8705574
Manuf. Invest. 2.94 3.39 0.13 0.24 0.56 1.01 19571 233431
Manuf. Watches 3.03 2.64 0.10 0.16 0.64 0.87 12297 142928
Manuf. Other 2.82 4.96 0.15 0.27 0.39 0.84 23288 991043
Mining 3.60 2.60 0.18 0.20 0.97 2.01 14026 31332
Rest. Hotels 2.19 0.80 0.09 0.29 0.91 1.30 7217 50212
Trade 5.95 50.04 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.67 19540 1521905
Transport 2.50 9.05 0.08 0.16 0.76 1.44 16605 4341944
Between industries
Industr.-means 3.42 3.30 0.12 0.08 0.75 1.12 50699 406424
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the constraint variables. Md denotes the
median and sd the standard deviation. Firms are classified into industries according to the
SFSO definition. Figures 4-11 in the Appendix show the distributions of these variables.
These figures show that the heterogeneity across industries as well as within individual
industries is very large. In the last row shows the medians and standard deviations across
industries, which are simply the medians and standard deviations of the entries in the
16 rows above. The between-industry variation is low compared to the within-industry
variation, showing that in order to capture the whole scope of heterogeneity within an
economy, it is useful to employ firm-level data.
To illustrate the aggregate dynamics of the key variables, that is, changes in output and
changes in employment, we show the average growth in employment and in output of our
sample over time. We distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms (Figure 1
- in red firms that are classified as constrained and in the blue firms with no constraints).
Taking the example of a liquidity constraint, we illustrate the aggregate dynamics. While
the fluctuations in output growth are similar for both constrained and unconstrained
firms, growth in employment fluctuates markedly more for constrained firms. Moreover,
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Figure 1: Average growth in employment and output for constrained and
non-constrained firms (1999-2013)
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Notes: The panel on the left shows average output growth for liquidity constrained firms
(solid red line) and for unconstrained firms (dashed blue line). The right panel shows average
employment growth. The averages are built using firm-level growth rates weighted by the
number of full-time equivalents.
there is a clear difference in the decline in employment during the Great Recession, where
constrained firms reduce employment by 1.5%, while constrained firms reduce employment
by 4.2%, thus more than twice as much. This figure motivates our analysis of the impact
of financial constraints on the intertwinement of employment and output.
4 Empirical analysis and results
Before turning to the main results, we discuss the estimation methodology and some
definitions in the following sections.
4.1 Specification and estimation methodology
Against the backdrop of the labor demand model outlined in section 2, we allow the
adjustment to the equilibrium labor demand to depend on the existence of financial
constraints. To gain a complete picture of the channels financial constraints work through,
we distinguish between external financial constraints, Extt−1,i, and internal financial
constraints, Intt−1,i. Thus, the response of employment to changes in demand in equation
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2, γy, is a function of our measures of financial constraints,
γ˜y = γy + γy,extExti,t−1 + γy,intInti,t−1 (3)
Financial constraints enter the model with a lag of one year, i.e. they reflect the financial
situation of the firm, before its activity increased or decreased. This is important from an
empirical point of view, as it ensures that the classification of a firm’s financial constraints
is not directly influenced by the contemporaneous change in activity.
Combining equation (3) with equation (2), we obtain the baseline specification of our
empirical model:
∆eti = γ˜n∆ei,t−1 + γy∆yi,t + γy,extExti,t−1∆yi,t + γy,intInti,t−1∆yi,t (4)
+γ˜w∆wi,t + β˜Xi,t + i,t,
where ∆eti is the log-change in employment, ∆yi,t the log-change in output (value added),
and ∆wi,t the average wage in a firm (total wage payments divided by FTE).
8
Our focus is on the estimates of γy,ext and γy,int, which are estimated simultaneously.
However, in principle, financial constraints should interact not only with the reduction
in demand but also with all variables in the model. To keep the equation neat, further
interaction terms have been left out in our baseline specification. We checked the robustness
of our results for the extended specifications, where we interact with additional control
variables, and found only very minor differences (see Section 6). Furthermore, it would
be conceivable that the internal and external financial constraints reinforce each other,
8An elasticity of employment with respect to an output of less than unity implies procyclical labor
productivity and might indicate that firms hoard labor (Biddle, 2014), even though procyclical labor
productivity might also be a result of other mechanisms. Using changes in housing prices to estimate
demand shocks, as in Giroud and Mueller (2017), has the advantage over our setup that the response of
employment is more closely tied to changes in demand. Below, we show that changes in output, which are
likely to be temporary, yield similar results as our baseline estimates, suggesting that using output as a
measure of ∆yi,t tends to capture temporary changes in demand. Given that both approaches show that
financial constraints impede labor hoarding, the results presented in this paper corroborate the findings in
Giroud and Mueller (2017) and show that they also have implications for labor productivity, as discussed
in the conclusion.
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motivating a version of (3) augmented with the interaction term γy,ext,intInti,t−1Exti,t−1.
However, the estimate of γy,ext,int turned out to be very small and mostly statistically
insignificant. Therefore, our baseline specification is (3) plugged into (2).
Xi,t includes various other explanatory variables. Because the financial constraints may
have a direct effect on the changes in employment, Inti,t−1, Exti,t−1. Furthermore, Xi,t
includes the change in the firm’s capital stock, as for example in Caggese and Cuat (2008).
In the literature, one finds strong evidence that financial constraints influence investment.
If constrained firms are forced to disinvest, labor-capital complementarities could cause
firms to reduce their labor force. Because we want to concentrate only on the direct impact
of financial constraints on employment, we follow Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011)
and control for these effects using the change in the firm’s capital stock.9 We also include
the capital-stock-to-FTE ratio in t−1 to control for the impact of different levels of capital
intensity between firms. Besides the industry-fixed effects we also include industry-fixed
effects interacted with the measures of financial constraints in order to control for time
independent factors that might arguably influence the degree of labor hoarding. Time-fixed
effects enter the equation to control for changes in aggregate employment growth.
In the baseline specification, we include industry-fixed effects to control for the unobserved
heterogeneity caused by time independent factors. We choose this approach, instead of
introducing firm-fixed effects, as we are working with an unbalanced sample of firms
in which the industries remain constant over time, while the universe of firms changes
from year to year. We have, however, conducted robustness tests using firm-fixed effects
instead of industry-fixed effects. The estimate results are practically identical to the
baseline results, indicating that there are no further time-independent factors that should
be included in equations.
To take possible asymmetric responses to a change in output into account, we estimate
our empirical model for observations with a negative change in output and observations
with a positive change in output separately. That is, we estimate separate coefficients for
upturns and downturns. In each case, we estimate four alternative specifications using
9The capital stock is also part of the labor demand equation used by, e.g., Nickell (1984), Burgess (1988)
and, more recently, Nickell (1999).
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combinations of internal and external financial constraints.
4.2 Baseline estimates
The impact of a one percent decrease in output on employment using equation (4) is
displayed in Table 3. The upper panel 1) shows the estimated results of γ˜y for the four
different combinations of financial constraints. The direct impact of a one percent decline
in output is given by γy on the first line. γy,int is the marginal effect of being internally
constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect of being externally constrained.
Column (1) shows the results for estimates including liquidity as a measure of internal
constraint and collateral as a measure of external constraint. Financially unconstrained
firms reduce employment by only 0.15% in response to a one percent decline in output,
with an elasticity significantly below one, which suggests that unconstrained firms hoard
labor (column 1). If a firm is liquidity constrained, this elasticity increases by a factor of
two, compared to the unconstrained firms. If the firm is collateral constrained, the firm
lays off 0.04 percentage points more employment than an unconstrained firm, implying
that constrained firms decrease their employment by approximately one-third more than
an otherwise unconstrained firm.
All measures of internal and external constraints show that firms with financial constraints
hoard less labor. Columns (2), (3) and (4) report the results for other measures and
combinations of constraints, including profitability as an internal constraint and the size
of the balance sheet as an external constraint. The estimates of γy,int and γy,ext indicate
that all four measures of financial constraints, taken alone, have a detrimental impact on
employment adjustment. While the impact of low collateral is somewhat lower, the other
constraints have a substantial impact.
The estimates above are based on regressions including both the external and the internal
constraint indicators. They thus have a conditional interpretation, that is, the coefficient
on the internal constraint is for a firm that is not externally constrained. Firms might
be faced with both forms of financial constraints. To give a simple illustration of the
elasticities for unconstrained and constrained firms, in panel 2), we report the coefficient
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for the unconstrained firms in the first row, which is identical to the coefficient γy in panel
1). The second row shows the elasticity for a firm that is only internally constrained (the
sum of γy and γy,int), the third the elasticity of a firm that is only externally constrained
(the sum of γy and γy,ext), and the last row the coefficient of a firm, which is both externally
and internally constrained. The latter is based on a regression that includes an interaction
between the external and internal constraints in addition to including the two constraints
separately. We then report the sum of γy, γy,int, γy,ext, and this interaction term.
Panel 2) shows that a firm’s employment elasticity is between 0.15% and 0.18% if it is
unconstrained (first row). Internal and external constraints lead to a marked rise in this
elasticity (second and third rows), as discussed above. Firms with internal and external
financial constraints reduce labor more than twice as much as unconstrained firms. Panel
3) shows that the share of firms being internally as well as externally constrained is
not negligible. Depending on the specification, the share of firms with both constraints
accounts for 22% - 30%.
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Table 3: Employment elasticities and financial constraints in downturns
1) Employment elasticity for unconstrained firms and marginal effects of financial constraints
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.154 0.183 0.153 0.167
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
γy,int 0.171 0.166 0.127 0.126
(0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
γy,ext 0.042 0.028 0.121 0.129
(0.015)*** (0.015)* (0.017)*** (0.017)***
R2 0.335 0.357 0.342 0.363
2) Implied employment elasticity γ˜y depending on financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.154 0.183 0.153 0.167
Only internally 0.325 0.349 0.280 0.294
Only externally 0.196 0.211 0.274 0.296
Internally and externally 0.367 0.378 0.401 0.422
3) Number of observations
Unconstrained 6316 7193 8825 9165
Only internally 6347 5470 4369 4029
Only externally 6760 6727 4254 4758
Internally and externally 5446 5479 7424 6920
Notes: The first panel 1) on the top shows the response in employment to a one percent decline in
output, depending on if a firm was constrained or not in the previous period. The direct impact
of a one percent decline in output is given by γy on the first line. γy,int is the marginal effect of
being internally constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect of being externally constrained. Standard
deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Panel 2) reports the sum of the
interaction coefficients (standard deviations have been excluded, all except the lowest entry in row
(2) are signficiant at the one percent level). The last panel shows the number of observations for each
specification. Covariates are not included in the table. See Table 13 for full regression output.
In an upturn, financial constraints could theoretically have either a dampening or an
enhancing impact on employment elasticity. In the first case, the rationale is straightforward:
Like in a downturn, financial constraints dampen labor demand when demand increases.
In this case, the marginal effects of financial constraints are negative, and constrained
firms have lower implied elasticities than unconstrained firms, implying that firms with
financial constraints lay off more labor in a downturn and take on less in an upturn.
The second case is based on the idea that labor hoarding is a cyclical phenomenon with an
investment character: firms keep on more labor than necessary in a downturn so that they
will not have to hire as much new staff in the subsequent upturn. Financially constrained
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firms, however, are unable to hoard enough labor and are forced to lay off more staff than
desired in a downturn, and they have to re-hire more labor for each percentage point rise
in output in an upturn. The interaction terms have positive coefficients, and the implied
employment elasticity is higher than that of unconstrained firms, both in a downturn and
in an upturn. In this case, financial constraints amplify the fluctuations of employment
and weaken those of labor productivity.
The data confirm the second hypothesis. The results are displayed in Table 4. The
estimates of γy,int and γy,ext are all significantly positive, with similar elasticities as for
downturns. Consequently, the implied elasticity of employment is in all cases lower for
unconstrained firms than for constrained firms. This implies that it is the financially
constrained firms that trigger the cycles on the labor market and lead to more comovement
between employment and output. In contrast, a weak cyclicality of employment in the
aggregate, caused by strong labor hoarding, would be a sign of financially healthy firms.
The result that financially constrained firms hoard less labor line up with the interpretation
of Giroud and Mueller (2017), who show that employment in establishments of firms with
higher leverage respond more elastically to the decline in US housing prices between 2006
and 2009. We show, in addition, that the financially constrained firms also hire more
labor during a consequent upturn, which corroborates the interpretation of employment
adjustment in terms of a labor hoarding concept. Furthermore, it is shown here that
internal constraints are even more important than external constraints, suggesting that
labor hoarding is mostly financed through retained profits and less through additional
leverage.
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Table 4: Employment elasticities and financial constraints in upturns
1) Employment elasticity for unconstrained firms and marginal effects of financial constraints
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.183 0.207 0.176 0.189
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
γy,int 0.125 0.075 0.078 0.039
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)**
γy,ext 0.051 0.038 0.146 0.157
(0.016)*** (0.016)** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
R2 0.334 0.333 0.343 0.344
2) Implied employment elasticity γ˜y depending on financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.183 0.207 0.176 0.189
Only internally 0.308 0.282 0.254 0.288
Only externally 0.234 0.245 0.321 0.346
Internally and externally 0.359 0.320 0.399 0.385
3) Number of observations
Unconstrained 8159 8365 11343 10811
Only internally 9367 9161 6638 7170
Only externally 8740 7697 5561 5254
Internally and externally 8224 9267 10954 11261
Notes: The first panel 1) on the top shows the response in employment to a one percent increase
in output, depending on if a firm was constrained or not in the previous period. The direct impact
of a one percent decline in output is given by γy on the first line. γy,int is the marginal effect of
being internally constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect of being externally constrained. Standard
deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Panel 2) reports the sum of the
interaction coefficients (standard deviations have been excluded, all except the lowest entry in row
(2) are signficiant at the one percent level). The last panel shows the number of observations for each
specification. Covariates are not included in the table.
Is employment adjustment asymmetric, that is, stronger in a recession than in a boom?
Table 5 reports the difference between the coefficients estimated for upturns and for
downturns to evaluate whether a decline in employment in a downturn is completely offset
in a subsequent upturn or whether some firms permanently reduce or increase employment.
The differences are only significant for the marginal effect of internal constraints. The
negative sign means that internally financially constrained firms re-hire less labor in an
upturn than they laid off in a previous downturn. Compared to the impact during a
downturn, this feature is economically small.10 Nevertheless, it still suggests that there
10This finding is not at odds with an asymmetric behavior of employment over the business cycle, as
documented, e.g., by Kohlbrecher and Merkl (2016) for the US. Our results even provide some support for
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are some permanent effects and that a subsidy on labor hoarding might be beneficial for
long-term employment trends, as suggested in Giroud and Mueller (2017).
Table 5: Asymmetry between upturn and downturn
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.029 0.024 0.023 0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015)
γy,int -0.046 -0.092 -0.049 -0.087
(0.021)** (0.023)*** (0.024)** (0.024)***
γy,ext 0.009 0.010 0.025 0.029
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Notes: This table reports the difference between the coefficients for upturns and downturns reported
in Tables 3 and 4, where we subtract the coefficient for the downturn estimates from that of the
upturn estimates. A negative and significant coefficient implies that a firm lays off more staff with
a one percent decline in output than it hires with a one percent increase in output (and a positive
coefficient vice versa). Standard deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
In the following subsections, we refine our results. We first quantify the impact of the wage
level on fluctuations in employment. Next, we look at the effect of financial constraints
at different levels of their distribution and then we test the transitory feature of labor
hoarding.
4.3 Low-wage versus high-wage firms
The wage level is likely to influence labor hoarding behavior. However, it is a priori
unclear whether firms in the high-wage segment hoard more or less labor than firms in the
low-wage segment. There are two opposing effects. On the one hand, adjustment costs are
probably higher for high-wage jobs, firstly because firing costs are set to be higher owing
to higher redundancy payments and more-generous dismissal conditions. Furthermore,
because the wage level should be determined by a worker’s productivity, high-wage jobs
will probably require higher hiring costs and higher initial training costs. For example,
Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012) provide evidence that hiring cost as a share of
wage costs are higher in occupations with higher skill requirements. This means that the
asymmetric changes in employment over the Swiss business cycle. This is because there is some evidence
pointing to asymmetric business cycles in (detrended) Swiss GDP (Detken, 2002). Given our results of a
quite-symmetric elasticity, these asymmetries in output changes would then translate into asymmetries in
employment changes.
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costs of laying off high-wage jobs might be larger than those of laying off low-wage jobs.
On the other hand, dismissing a worker with a high wage decreases wage expenditures
more than dismissing a worker with a low wage. This means that the costs of laying off
high-wage jobs are larger than those of laying off low-wage jobs.
We therefore split our sample at the median firm-level average wage. In our data set,
we do not have wage data per employee, only the average wage per firm. Therefore, we
cannot distinguish between different jobs within the same firm. Thus, the classification
by firm-level average wage, which we use for this exercise, is only a proxy. Especially
for firms with very heterogeneous remuneration schemes, the average can be misleading.
Nonetheless, the results in Figure 2 show a clear picture: the employment elasticities of
high-wage firms (grey bars) are, for almost all specifications, lower than those for low-wage
firms (black bars). This suggests that the first channel dominates, i.e., in the high wage
segment, hiring and firing costs tend to be relatively more important than the wage savings.
Figure 2 shows a further feature: The effect of financial constraints is smaller for firms
paying low wages. Indeed, the labor elasticity of a low-wage firm increases by a factor
1.7 to 2.0 depending on whether it is unconstrained or doubly constrained, while for
high-wage firms, it triples. In the specification balance sheet-profitability (bottom right),
unconstrained high-wage firms have a labor demand elasticity of 0.13, compared to 0.23 for
the low-wage firms. If the firm has a small balance sheet combined with low profitability,
the implied labor elasticity of the low-wage firm will be 1.8 times higher, while for the
high-wage firm, it will be 3.3 times higher. In fact, the implied elasticity will reach 0.42
for both low-wage and high-wage firms. Thus, high-wage firms hoard labor only if they
dispose of sufficient funding. If they are financially constrained, the hoarding behavior
becomes very similar to that of firms in the low-wage segment.
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Figure 2: Employment elasticities during a downturn and financial
constraints by wage level
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Notes: Red bars represent the high-wage firms and the blue bars the low-wage firms. The two
bars in the first column represent the implied labor elasticity for doubly constrained firms
measured by γy + γy,int + γy,ext, the two bars in the second column represent externally
constrained firms measured by γy+γy,ext , the two bars in the third column represent internally
constrained firms measured by γy + γy,intand the two bars in the fourth column represent the
labor elasticity for non-constrained firms measured by γy.
4.4 Marginal effects at different points of the distribution
Up to now, we have estimated the impact of a firm being constrained compared to a firm
not being constrained. In a next step, we analyze the impact of financial constraints on
employment for a finer grid. This gives information on whether the impact of financial
constraints on employment is evenly distributed. Thereafter, we estimate the equation
using continuous data. This allows us to gain a more detailed picture of the marginal
effects of financial constraints.
For the finer breakdown, we construct six equally sized bins. The baseline regression is
estimated separately six times (once for each bin) for all eight specifications shown in
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Figure 3, which therefore results in 32 separate estimates.
The upper left chart in Figure 3 shows the results for the specification in which the liquidity
constraint is combined with the collateral constraint. Note that liquidity is divided into six
bins, while the collateral constraint remains a binary variable. The first bin contains the
lowest sixth of the distribution, i.e., the most liquidity-constrained firms, while the sixth
bin contains the less liquidity-constrained firms, i.e., the firms with the most-abundant
liquidity. The grey bars represent the impact of a one percent decrease in output for
firms that are not collateral constrained, i.e., that have high collateral, and the black bars
represent the impact for firms that are collateral-constrained, i.e., that have low collateral.
All charts in Figure 3 show that firms lay off more labor if they are doubly constrained
(black bars are larger than the grey bars). Thus, the results of the baseline specification
are confirmed in this exercise. The bars tend to decrease from the first to the sixth bin.
This indicates that the results shown in the previous section are not driven by the tails of
the distributions.
However, Figure 3 also shows that financial constraints do not have a linear influence on
employment. The decrease is monotonic only in the upper end of the distribution (bins
4-6). At the lower end, where firms are more constrained (bins 1-3), the pattern is not
clear-cut. Actually, the size of the balance sheet is the only constraint that is monotonic
throughout the whole distribution. This suggests that the exact level of the constraining
factor is not very relevant for values below the median of the annual distribution. These
results indicate that our binary classification with the median as the threshold in the
baseline specification is a sound choice. The coefficients of a linear specification would not
be robust, depending on the point in the distribution.
23
Figure 3: Employment elasticities during a downturn for a finer
classification of financial constraints
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Notes: The blue bars represent the impact of a one percent decrease in output on employment
for a given bin if a firm is not constrained otherwise as mentioned by the number of the bin. The
red bars include the additional impact of a second constraint. Bin (1) contains the lowest sixth
of the distribution of a given constraint, i.e., the most-constrained firms, while bin (6) contains
the most-unconstrained firms.
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We illustrate this feature with a linear estimation complemented by a piece-wise estimation.
The impact of financial constraints on employment based on a linear specification is shown
in Table 6. Section 1) shows the results for the whole sample of firms. The coefficients
of the interaction terms, γy,int and γy,ext, are significant in most cases and have the
correct sign.11 The results of the piece-wise estimation are shown in Section 2) for firms
that are constrained more than the median and in Section 3) for firms constrained less
than the median. The results for the constrained firms show that only two of the eight
coefficients are positive and significant, namely, those two that measure the marginal
impact of a change in the size of the balance sheet. This confirms the results discussed
above. Importantly, it certifies that it is not possible to measure the marginal effects of
constraints on employment for firms in the lower part of the distribution. In contrast,
the coefficients for the less-constrained firms are mostly significant, and all are positive,
reflecting the monotonicity seen in Figure 3 for the upper range of the distribution.
11Financial constraints are defined as the deviation of the annual mean from the firm-specific measure of
constraint. Therefore, lower liquidity, profitability, collateral or balance sheet lead to a rise in the measure
of constraint and should, in turn, lead to a larger adjustment in employment. Thus, the coefficient of the
interaction terms, γy,int and γy,ext, should be positive.
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Table 6: Employment elasticities during a downturn in a linear
specification
1) Marginal effects of financial constraints - all firms
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.243 0.257 0.273 0.282
(0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)***
γy,int 0.001 0.031 -0.001 -0.066
(0.000)* (0.094) (0.000)*** (0.087)
γy,ext 0.005 0.005 0.056 0.053
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)***
2) Marginal effects of financial constraints - constrained firms
γy 0.430 0.300 0.435 0.332
(0.071)*** (0.044)*** (0.053)*** (0.026)***
γy,int -0.011 -0.346 -0.022 -0.229
(0.018) (0.079)*** (0.018) (0.146)
γy,ext -0.043 0.060 0.040 0.056
(0.073) (0.063) (0.018)** (0.017)***
3) Marginal effects of financial constraints - non-constrained firms
γy 0.181 0.381 0.179 0.336
(0.014)*** (0.037)*** (0.016)*** (0.0268)***
γy,int 0.002 0.509 0.000 0.404
(0.003) (0.106)*** (0.000)** (0.079)***
γy,ext 0.004 0.004 0.025 0.008
(0.001)*** (0.060)** (0.007)*** (0.010)
Notes: This table reports the coefficients of a regression, where financial constraints are not classified
as a zero/one variable, as in our baseline estimates, but instead as a continuous variable. We report
results for all firms in panel 1) and for the firms that are classified as financially constrained in
our earlier specification in panel 2) and the ones that are classified as unconstrained in our baseline
estimate in panel 3). Standard deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
4.5 Transitory feature of labor hoarding
We have shown that financial constraints have a substantial influence on employment
because they hamper the ability of firms to hoard labor. In this subsection, we focus on
the transitory feature of labor hoarding. The expected persistence of a downturn plays a
crucial role in the labor hoarding behavior of firms. If firms believe that the downturn is
temporary, downsizing their labor force will entail future re-hiring costs, so the incentives
to hoard labor are high. If, however, firms associate the change in demand with permanent
developments, they will have an incentive to more or less completely adjust their labor
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force to the lower level of output.12
We test whether the results above are influenced by firms that adjust their employment to
permanent changes in demand. To do this, we re-estimate the baseline equation using only
those observations for which we have an indication that the firm expects the downturn,
respectively, the upturn, to be temporary. We use the sum a firm spends on temporary
work to capture the cyclical movement of employment: because temporary work is quickly
available and easily reversible, it will be used by firms as a buffer to regulate their labor
force when they assume the fluctuations in demand are set to be temporary. In contrast,
it would be inefficient for employers to take on temporary work for a permanent job
because the retention level is generally low and the fixed costs of work-related training are
therefore less worthwhile (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, 2002). Thus, if firms assume
that an increase in demand is permanent, they will hire permanent workers, while if an
upturn is seen to be temporary, it will be more attractive to take on temporary workers.
Accordingly, if firms expect a downturn to be temporary, they will try to keep as much
as possible of their permanent labor force and diminish their costs by reducing temporary
work with no redundancy pay (Dolado, Garc´ıa-Serrano, and Jimeno, 2002).
We assume, therefore, that when an upturn (decline) in output falls together with a
rise (decline) in temporary work, the firm believes that the fluctuations in demand are
temporary. We proceed by looking at the sub-set of the sample, where changes in output
fall together with a change in temporary work and the two move in the same direction.
Because the costs for temporary work only amount to 1.5% of total labor costs on average,
it is fair to claim that the total change in employment is not influenced in a meaningful
way by changes in the costs for temporary work.13 Because not all firms employ temporary
work, this exercise reduces the sample to approximately 12, 000 observations.
Table 7 displays the results for a one percent decrease in output. The results are very
12Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) analyze the cyclicality of labor productivity, focusing on the
impact of a transitory demand shock. They measure the transitory shocks as the deviation of downstream
demand from the linear trend.
13See Table 14 in the Appendix. The share of temporary work is quite homogenous across industries,
ranging from 0.5% (restaurants and hotels) to 1.7% (business services, manufacturing of investment goods),
with the exception of construction, where 6% of employment expenditures are temporary. However,
industry effects should not influence our results, because we control for industry-fixed effects and we
include interactions between the industry-fixed effect and the financial constraint indicator.
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similar to the results shown in Table 3. This suggests that the influence of financial
constraints on employment applies to the cyclical component of labor adjustment.14
Table 7: Employment elasticities during a temporary downturn
1) Employment elasticity for unconstrained firms and marginal effects of financial constraints
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.158 0.204 0.175 0.197
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
γy,int 0.192 0.171 0.131 0.117
(0.031)*** (0.037)*** (0.033)*** (0.037)***
γy,ext 0.068 0.042 0.186 0.192
(0.031)** (0.034) (0.035)*** (0.035)***
2) Implied employment elasticity γ˜y depending on financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.158 0.204 0.175 0.197
Only internally 0.351 0.374 0.306 0.313
Only externally 0.227 0.246 0.361 0.388
Internally and externally 0.419 0.417 0.492 0.505
Notes: The first panel 1) on the top shows the response in employment to a one percent decline
in output for firms, which decrease temporary workers during the decline in output. The direct
impact of a one percent decline in output is given by γy on the first line. γy,int is the marginal
effect of being internally constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect of being externally constrained.
Standard deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Panel 2) reports the sum of
the interaction coefficients (standard deviations have been excluded, all except the lowest entry in
row (2) are significant at the one percent level). Covariates are not included in the table.
5 Macroeconomic implications
Our final point is to estimate how large the macroeconomic impact of financial constraints
is on employment growth. We take our firm-level findings to the macro level by means of a
counterfactual analysis. We estimate a counterfactual aggregate employment growth series
excluding the impact of financial constraints on the labor hoarding behavior of firms. First,
at the firm level, we exclude the impact of financial constraints by deducting the interaction
terms combining the financial constraints and output growth, as in equation (4), from
actual employment. Then, these firm-level counterfactual growth rates are weighted with
the number of employees of each firm and added up to an aggregate counterfactual growth
14The results for an increase in output can be found in Table 15 in the Appendix. The figures also show
that, when output increases, the coefficients are qualitatively similar to those of the baseline equation.
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series.
The results of this exercise show that the effect of financial constraints on labor hoarding
is quantitatively important for aggregate employment too. Table 8 shows the percentage
reduction in the variance of the counterfactual compared to actual aggregate employment.
Depending on the specification, the variance of the aggregate employment growth would
be 17% to 26% lower if internal and external constraints had not influenced the scope of
firms’ labor hoarding. As seen in all previous estimates, the impact is smaller when only
a single constraint is taken into account.
Table 8: Reduction in variance of the counterfactual compared to actual
aggregate employment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
Excluding impact of only internal constraints -20.57 -14.83 -15.07 -10.95
Excluding impact of only external constraints -6.85 -6.15 -4.86 -6.57
Excluding impact of internal and external constraints -26.41 -20.43 -19.37 -17.07
The Great Recession is a good example to illustrate the impact of financial constraints on
employment growth: Aggregate employment of the firms included in our sample increased
by 2.7% in 2008, when the economy was still growing dynamically, shortly before the
recession set in. In 2009, it decreased by 2.7%.15 The fluctuations in employment would
have been smaller if the firms had faced no liquidity and no collateral constraints. The
counterfactual would have increased by 2.4% in 2008 and decreased by 2.0% in 2009.
Thus, while aggregate employment growth decreased by 5.4% from peak to trough, our
counterfactual only decreased by 4.4%. For the other combinations of constraint measures
the change in employment growth between 2008 and 2009 lies between 4.7% and 4.8%.
This example describes the impact of financial constraints on the labor hoarding behavior
of firms well: financial constraints are not the cause for employment cycles, but they do
influence the size of their fluctuations.
15These figures do not coincide exactly with the official labor statistics (the payroll survey and the labor
force survey) because the source is different and some sectors such as public administration and financial
services are not included in our data set. However, the overall development is similar.
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6 Robustness
In this section, we conduct two tests to provide evidence for our causal interpretation
of the results. First, financial constraints might be correlated with firm-level unobserved
heterogeneity. We therefore use an exogenous component of the balance sheet to measure
changes in financial constraints, and we obtain similar results as above. Second, we use
industry-level aggregates to test whether the results are driven by the endogeneity of
firm-level output.
6.1 Exogeneity of financial constraints
First, we address the possibility that financially constrained firms decrease their employment
disproportionably in a downturn, not because of their financial constraints but because
of an unobserved firm-endogenous feature correlated with the financial situation.16 We
therefore construct a measure of variations of the balance sheet from net financial income.
As outlined below, it is unrelated to idiosyncratic factors and should be unpredictable
(as long as stock prices are unpredictable), such that a variation in the return from net
financial assets reflects exogenous changes in the financial constraints.
To do so, we divide our measure of profits in two categories: firms’ operative profits
and firms’ financial profits. Besides the profits stemming from firms’ normal activities
(operative profits), our data set includes firms’ financial income (which consists of the
income from holding financial assets) and firms’ write-downs on financial assets. Financial
income and write-downs occur when firms hold financial assets that gain or lose in value,
or the firm receives a dividend payment on their financial assets. According to Swiss
accounting standards, these include only profits or losses with variable returns, which
are arguably unpredictable. Fixed interest payments or interest income have a separate
position on the balance sheet, and we exclude them from net financial income. Thus,
short-term changes in the net income from financial assets are mainly driven by financial
market developments and are therefore not influenced by the single firm’s operative management
16In Section 6, we show that firm-fixed effects do not influence the results. This implies that
time-invariant firm-specific features are not relevant for our analysis. It is, however, possible that
time-variant, firm-endogenous characteristics play a role.
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decisions or by other unobserved factors influencing the firms’ labor demand.17
Because the share of financial profits in total profits is usually small, and therefore,
we cannot clearly distinguish how much financial constraints change due to changes in
financial assets, we perform this estimation with a linear specification. Our analysis in
Section 4.4 suggests, however, that small changes only have an effect in the upper half of
the distribution, where financial constraints have a monotonic impact on employment (see
Figure 3). Thus, we reduce our sample to the upper half of the distribution, where we
can use a linear specification. Furthermore, because not all firms have financial income or
write-downs, the sample is reduced to 2, 700 observations in this analysis.
We estimate the following equation including both financial profitability (ProfF ini,t−1)
and operative profitability (ProfOpi,t−1):
γ˜y = γy + γy,finProfF ini,t−1 + γy,opProfOpi,t−1 (5)
Table 9 shows the estimated coefficients, confirming that firms with larger financial or
operating profits (less constrained) adjust employment during a downturn by less than
constrained firms. The coefficients of the two interaction terms for financial an operating
profits are not significantly different from each other.18 Thus, a one percent decline in
financial profits has a qualitatively similar effect on labor hoarding as a one percent decline
in operating profits, suggesting that the internal financial constraints hindering labor
hoarding are not solely a result of unobservable idiosyncratic factors, which might influence
both profits and employment. Together with the fact that net financial profits are arguably
exogenous to firm’s idiosyncratic shocks, as argued above, we interpret this as evidence
that the financial situation causally impacts labor hoarding behavior.
17Statistically, the output share of operating profits and financial profits are uncorrelated.
18Indeed, they look remarkably similar. We tested whether this is spuriously due the specification of
the financial constraint as profits relative to output by using a ’placebo specification’ with a simulated
random variable. We found no significant effect of such a variable. Furthermore, if we do not exclude the
half of the distribution of firms with low profitability, the effect becomes somewhat smaller, as expected.
However, the result that the impacts of financial and operative profits are not significantly different from
each other remains robust.
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Table 9: Employment elasticities during a downturn with exogenous
variations in internal constraint
γy 0.353
(0.037)***
γy,fin -0.464
(0.107)***
γy,op -0.423
(0.088)***
Standard deviation in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Notes: Estimated effect of internal constraints measured by financial profits (γy,fin) and
operating profits (γy,op) separately. Financial profits are only components of the balance sheet,
which are exogenous to firm’s productivity or idiosyncratic shocks. Standard deviation in
parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
6.2 Exogeneity of output
The within-industry heterogeneity is substantial, as shown in Table 2. Thus, the use
of firm-level data, for both the dependent and the explanatory variables, ensures that
this within-industry dispersion is fully taken into account in the estimated results. The
drawback, however, is that changes in firm-specific employment could affect output. If
such changes are correlated with the financial situation, this may bias our results. To
investigate this more closely, we have replicated our estimation with changes in output
defined at a higher aggregation level, i.e., at the industry-level, as in Aghion, Farhi, and
Kharroubi (2015). As they argue, the use of explanatory variables at a higher aggregation
stage reduces the scope for reverse causality because the changes in employment of an
individual firm will not influence the characteristics of a whole industry.
The impact of a decrease in industry-level output on firm-level employment is displayed in
Table 10. Generally, the estimates are less precise compared to the baseline specification.
This is not surprising, given that average fluctuations at the industry level hardly reflect
the very heterogeneous developments at the firm level. However, the interaction terms with
the various financial constraint variables are, in most cases, qualitatively and quantitatively
consistent with the results using firm-level output. Thus, the results support that our
baseline equation is correctly specified and is probably not strongly influenced by reverse
causality. In particular the liquidity measure as internal financial constraint is clearly
robust to these changes. We therefore put most emphasis on the internal liquidity constraint
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in our interpretation of the general findings.
Table 10: Employment elasticities during a downturn with industry-level
value-added
1) Employment elasticity for unconstrained firms and marginal effects of financial constraints
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.075 0.152 0.145 0.192
(0.072) (0.073)** (0.070)** (0.070)**
γy,int 0.205 0.071 0.193 0.055
(0.060)*** (0.056) (0.061)*** (0.057)
γy,ext 0.106 0.086 -0.005 0.036
(0.054)* (0.054) (0.059) (0.059)
2) Implied employment elasticity γ˜y depending on financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.075 0.152 0.145 0.192
Only internally 0.281 0.223 0.338 0.247
Only externally 0.181 0.237 0.140 0.228
Internally and externally 0.386 0.309 0.333 0.283
Notes: The first panel 1) on the top shows the response in employment to a one percent decline in
output, now measured by industry-level value added instead of firm-level value added. The direct
impact of a one percent decline in output is given by γy on the first line. γy,int is the marginal
effect of being internally constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect of being externally constrained.
Standard deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Panel 2) reports the sum of
the interaction coefficients (standard deviations have been excluded, the liquidity constraint remains
always significant at the 1% level, the collateral constraint at the 10% level). Covariates are not
included in the table.
6.3 Unobserved heterogeneity and industry trends
In the following, we conduct several estimates with alternative specifications to test the
robustness of our results.
First, we test whether the inclusion of industry-level trends influences the reaction of
employment to a change in output. For this purpose, we add industry-time-fixed effects
to our baseline equation (column 2 in Table 11). The results show that the inclusion of
industry-time-fixed effects has practically no impact on the marginal effect of financial
constraints on employment.
In the baseline specification, we assumed that by introducing industry-fixed effects, the
unobserved heterogeneity caused by time independent factors had been sufficiently controlled
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for. This approach seemed reasonable, as we are working with an unbalanced sample
of firms in which the industries remain constant over time, while the universe of firms
changes from year to year. By emphasizing industry-specific characteristics, however,
we may have omitted firm-specific unobserved fixed effects that could be correlated with
the regressor. To test this, we re-estimate the baseline equations using firm-fixed effects
instead of industry-fixed effects (column 3). The estimate results are practically identical
to the baseline results, indicating that there are no further time-independent factors that
should be included in equations. Furthermore, we test whether the reaction of employment
to a change in output differs across sectors, and we find robust results (column 4).
As already discussed, in a dynamic model such as ours, at least the lagged dependent
variable might be correlated with the error term. The problem is typically addressed by
using a GMM estimate, as proposed by Arellano and Bond. (1991) (column 5). The
application of this estimator yields a slightly more pronounced effect of the financial
constraints. The small difference between the estimates of the coefficients of interest is
likely due to the fact that the autocorrelation of our dependent variable is quite contained
, and with 16 years of data, the time-series dimension of our data set is reasonably large.19
19We use three lagged values of ∆et−1,i as a basis for the moment conditions. We test the validity of
instruments using the Hansen statistic, and we test for remaining second-order autocorrelation in the first
difference of the error term. Neither test points to misspecification; see Table 16 in the Appendix.
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Table 11: Employment elasticities during a downturn in alternative
specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Baseline Industry-time Firm-fixed Industry- GMM-based
-fixed effects effects output estimate
interaction
Measure of constraints: Collateral and Liquidity
γy 0.154 0.148 0.156 0.188 0.120
(0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.050)*** (0.023)***
γy,int 0.171 0.171 0.166 0.147 0.190
(0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.028)***
γy,ext 0.042 0.042 0.046 0.035 0.077
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)** (0.028)***
Measure of constraints: Collateral and Profitability
γy 0.183 0.178 0.191 0.235 0.151
(0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.045)*** (0.022)***
γy,int 0.166 0.163 0.146 0.140 0.195
(0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.017)*** (0.028)**
γy,ext 0.028 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.062
(0.015)* (0.015)** (0.018)* (0.016) (0.028)***
Measure of constraints: Balance sheet and Liquidity
γy 0.153 0.147 0.171 0.188 0.131
(0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.048)*** (0.019)***
γy,int 0.127 0.125 0.133 0.107 0.137
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.030)***
γy,ext 0.121 0.122 0.116 0.116 0.152
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (0.017)*** (0.034)***
Measure of constraints: Balance sheet and Profitability
γy 0.167 0.162 0.179 0.220 0.149
(0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.045)*** (0.019)***
γy,int 0.126 0.123 0.111 0.106 0.147
(0.017)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.017)*** (0.029)***
γy,ext 0.129 0.131 0.129 0.117 0.159
(0.017)*** (0.021)* (0.021)*** (0.017)*** (0.031)***
Notes: The first panel on the top shows the response in employment to a one percent decline
in output, for collateral and liquidity constraint measures for internal and external constraints,
respectively. The direct impact of a one percent decline in output is given by γy on the first
line. γy,int is the marginal effect of being internally constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect
of being externally constrained. Standard deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. The panels below repeat the same for different constraint definitions, as indicated
in the panel headers. The columns indicate the estimation strategy. In column (1) we repeat
our baseline estimates, in column (2) we include industry and time fixed effects, in column (3)
firm-fixed effects, in column (4) we include an interaction term between the industry fixed effect
and the change in output as a control. In column (5) we use GMM with three lagged values
(starting from t− 2 of the change in employment for the moment conditions.
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In our baseline specification, we left out several interaction terms in order to keep the
number of coefficients small. While from a theoretical point of view, financial constraints
should interact with all variables in the model, the baseline equation includes only the
interaction terms of the financial constraints with the demand shock and the industry-fixed
effects. We have conducted robustness tests including the interaction terms of financial
constraints with the following further variables: the change in employment in t − 1, the
change in wages in t, the change in capital stock in t and the capital-stock-to-FTE ratio
in t− 1. These interaction terms are in some specifications significant, but the coefficients
are very small and the impact on labor elasticity is minor. The results of these estimates
are reported in Table 12.
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Table 12: Employment elasticities during a downturn, including
interaction terms with other variables included in the equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Baseline Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction
with ∆ei,t−1 with ∆wi,t with change with capital-stock
in capital stock -to-FTE-ratio
Measure of constraints: Collateral and Liquidity
γy 0.154 0.154 0.147 0.155 0.155
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.12)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
γy,int 0.171 0.172 0.192 0.171 0.172
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.16)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
γy,ext 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.043
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Measure of constraints: Collateral and Profitability
γy 0.183 0.183 0.177 0.184 0.183
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
γy,int 0.166 0.167 0.190 0.166 0.165
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
γy,ext 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.030
(0.015)** (0.015)* (0.015) (0.015)* (0.015)**
Measure of constraints: Balance sheet and Liquidity
γy 0.153 0.152 0.140 0.152 0.153
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
γy,int 0.127 0.127 0.144 0.126 0.128
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
γy,ext 0.121 0.122 0.134 0.122 0.121
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Measure of constraints: Balance sheet and Profitability
γy 0.167 0.167 0.155 0.167 0.167
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
γy,int 0.126 0.126 0.146 0.126 0.126
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
γy,ext 0.129 0.130 0.142 0.30 0.129
(0.017)*** (0.017)* (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Notes: The first panel on the top shows the response in employment to a one percent decline in output,
for collateral and liquidity constraint measures for internal and external constraints, respectively. The
direct impact of a one percent decline in output is given by γy on the first line. γy,int is the marginal
effect of being internally constrained, and γy,ext the marginal effect of being externally constrained.
Standard deviation in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The panels below repeat the
same for different constraint definitions, as indicated in the panel headers. The columns indicate
the estimation strategy. In column (1) we repeat our baseline estimates, in column (2) we interact
financial constraints with the lagged change in employment, in column (3) with the change in the
average wages, in column (4) with the change in the capital stock, and in column (6) with the K/E
ratio. We report the coefficients as in our baseline estimates, not the controls. The interactions are
therefore not reported here, but can be requested from the authors.
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7 Conclusions
This paper documents the role of financial constraints in employment adjustment using
firm-level data from balance-sheet and income statements, including firm-level employment
statistics. The data are a sample from the universe of Swiss firms, including all industries
of the economy, except the financial and public sectors. Also included are very small
firms, which typically do not publish their economic figures. We find that the adjustment
of firms’ employment to changes in output depends on their financial situation. Firms
with limited funding availability resize their labor force more strongly than firms that
have abundant funding availability. Financially unconstrained firms are able to hoard
more labor.
Our setup allows us to go into further detail. We show that not only are external financing
constraints an important factor, but the availability of internal funding, in particular, has
a large influence. The strongest effect is observed if internal and external constraints
occur jointly. A further non-linearity arises as the marginal effect of financial constraints
decreases with a deteriorating financial situation, and it is generally smaller for firms
paying low wages. This result suggests that it is particularly costly to lay off workers with
higher wages, who tend to be more-skilled workers.
The amplifying effects of financial constraints are quite similar in upturns and downturns.
Financially constrained firms not only decrease their employment more when output
decreases, but they also increase their employment more strongly when output increases.
Our results are therefore consistent with the view that financial constraints impede the
labor hoarding behavior of firms, because firms that hoard labor during a downturn do
not hire as much labor in an upturn. We furthermore show that this effect is relevant for
aggregate employment, suggesting that employment would have declined by around two
thirds of its actual decline during the Great Recession if financial constraints would not
have hindered labor hoarding. This implies that financially constrained firms contribute
disproportionately to the comovement between employment and output. In contrast, a
weak cyclicality of employment, caused by strong labor hoarding, is largely driven by
financially healthy firms.
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These results complement the large body of literature on the role of financial constraints
on investment, where financial constraints are typically found to increase the sensitivity
of investment to shocks. Through this channel, financial frictions are found to amplify the
propagation of shocks to the macroeconomy. Our results suggest that a similar mechanism
works through the labor market and that the depth of financial frictions is potentially
important to understand labor hoarding, confirming and extending the findings in Giroud
and Mueller (2017). As we look at the response of employment to changes in output,
our results have implications for the cyclicality of labor productivity. In particular, an
economy with more financially healthy firms would be characterized by more cyclical labor
productivity. An interesting avenue for future research would be to look at the strong
increase in the cyclicality of labor productivity documented in Fernald and Wang (2016)
and to evaluate the role of firms’ improved financial health and reduction in financial
constraints.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 4: Liquidity, 1999-2013
Notes: Distribution of firms’ liquidity (sales to labour costs ratio)
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Figure 5: Liquidity, by industry, 1999-2013
Figure 6: Profitability, 1999-2013
Notes: Distribution of firms’ profitability (EBIT to value added ratio)
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Figure 7: Profitability, by industry, 1999-2013
Figure 8: Collateral, 1999-2013
Notes: Distribution of firms’ collateral (sum of a firm’s structures (buildings and land) and machines per
unit outstanding debt)
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Figure 9: Collateral, by industry, 1999-2013
Figure 10: Size of balance sheet, 1999-2013
Notes: Distribution of the size of balance sheet (in 1000 CHF)
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Figure 11: Size of balance sheet, by industry, 1999-2013
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Table 13: Impact of 1% decrease in value added on employment, full
regression output
Coefficient Std.dev. t p
γr 0.154 0.154 12.866 0.00
γr,int 0.171 0.171 10.682 0.00
γr,ext 0.042 0.042 2.841 0.00
γint 0.010 0.010 1.640 0.10
γext -0.013 -0.013 -1.855 0.06
∆e (lag) 0.027 0.027 4.084 0.00
∆w -0.609 -0.609 -45.635 0.00
∆capitalstock 0.014 0.014 8.066 0.00
capital/labour (lag) 0.000 0.000 0.514 0.61
year
2001 0.013 0.013 3.825 0.00
2002 -0.006 -0.006 -1.715 0.09
2003 -0.013 -0.013 -3.869 0.00
2004 -0.006 -0.006 -1.793 0.07
2005 -0.005 -0.005 -1.400 0.16
2006 -0.004 -0.004 -1.046 0.30
2007 0.004 0.004 1.213 0.22
2008 0.009 0.009 2.720 0.01
2009 -0.023 -0.023 -6.156 0.00
2010 0.002 0.002 0.597 0.55
2011 0.010 0.010 3.329 0.00
2012 0.001 0.001 0.279 0.78
2013 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.95
Industry x ConstrInt
1 -0.034 -0.034 -3.482 0.00
2 -0.035 -0.035 -2.886 0.00
3 -0.022 -0.022 -2.975 0.00
4 -0.023 -0.023 -1.028 0.30
5 -0.026 -0.026 -2.599 0.01
6 0.002 0.002 0.140 0.89
7 -0.014 -0.014 -1.287 0.20
8 -0.010 -0.010 -0.912 0.36
9 -0.014 -0.014 -0.528 0.60
10 -0.012 -0.012 -1.912 0.06
11 -0.015 -0.015 -2.358 0.02
12 -0.014 -0.014 -1.623 0.10
13 -0.002 -0.002 -0.141 0.89
14 -0.014 -0.014 -1.313 0.19
15 -0.021 -0.021 -2.534 0.01
Industry x ConstrExt
1 0.008 0.008 0.889 0.37
2 0.008 0.008 0.671 0.50
3 0.005 0.005 0.652 0.51
4 0.022 0.022 1.937 0.05
5 0.016 0.016 1.624 0.10
6 0.011 0.011 1.018 0.31
7 -0.002 -0.002 -0.219 0.83
8 0.002 0.002 0.215 0.83
9 0.055 0.055 4.089 0.00
10 0.007 0.007 0.963 0.34
11 0.012 0.012 1.649 0.10
12 0.017 0.017 1.824 0.07
13 0.020 0.020 0.984 0.33
14 -0.002 -0.002 -0.218 0.83
15 0.012 0.012 1.694 0.09
Industry
2 -0.008 -0.008 -0.607 0.54
3 -0.019 -0.019 -2.108 0.04
4 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.99
5 0.002 0.002 0.197 0.84
6 -0.027 -0.027 -2.161 0.03
7 0.007 0.007 0.563 0.57
8 -0.026 -0.026 -2.393 0.02
9 0.012 0.012 1.118 0.26
10 -0.019 -0.019 -2.406 0.02
11 -0.027 -0.027 -3.278 0.00
12 -0.010 -0.010 -1.032 0.30
13 -0.028 -0.028 -2.502 0.01
14 -0.019 -0.019 -1.698 0.09
15 -0.022 -0.022 -2.754 0.01
16 -0.020 -0.020 -2.156 0.03
Constant 0.021 0.021 2.515 0.01
Full regression output for Equation (2), with low liquidity as measure of internal constraint and
low collateral ratio as measure of external constraint, in the case of a decrease value added. Full
regression outputs for the other specifications are available on request.
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Table 14: Costs of temporary work
Share of temporary work costs
to total labour costs, in%
Aggregate 1.5
Industry
Business Services 1 0.8
Business Services 2 1.7
Construction 6.1
Education 0.3
Energy 1.3
Entertainment 0.6
Health 0.8
IT 1
Manufacturing Pharmaceuticals 1
Manufacturing Investment goods 1.7
Manufacturing Watches and electronics 1.1
Manufacturing Other 1.3
Mining 1.6
Restaurants Hotels 0.5
Trade 0.6
Transport 0.9
Table 15: Impact of 1% increase in value added on employment, sample
restricted to observations for which expenditures for
temporary work increase
1) Employment elasticity for unconstrained firms and marginal effects of financial constraints
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of internal constraint Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Measure of external constraint Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
γy 0.241 0.252 0.235 0.241
(0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)***
γy,int 0.097 0.073 0.027 0.021
(0.038)*** (0.035)** (0.039) (0.037)
γy,ext 0.062 0.055 0.220 0.217
(0.035)* (0.035) (0.035)*** (0.035)***
2) Implied employment elasticity γ˜y depending on financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.241 0.252 0.235 0.241
Only internally 0.338 0.325 0.262 0.262
Only externally 0.303 0.307 0.454 0.458
Internally and externally 0.400 0.380 0.481 0.479
Standard deviation in parenthesis, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 16: Specification tests for GMM estimate
Collateral Collateral Balance sheet Balance sheet
Liquidity Profitability Liquidity Profitability
Arellano-Bond test 0.80 0.73 0.76 0.856
for 2nd-order autocorrelation
Hansen test 0.52 0.41 0.43 0.309
for overidentifying restrictions
p-values (Hansen test: based on χ2(90) distribution).
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